As a general trend, the complexities of modern spacecraft are increasing to include more ambitious mission goals with tighter timing requirements and on-board autonomy. As a byproduct, the protective features that monitor the performance of these systems have also increased in scope and complexity. Given cost and schedule pressures, there is an increasing emphasis on understanding the behavior of the system at design time. Formal test-driven verification and validation (V&V) is rarely able to test the significant combinatorics of states, and often finds problems late in the development cycle forcing design changes that can be costly. This paper describes the approach the SMAP Fault Protection team has taken to address some of the above-mentioned issues.
Nomenclature

I. Introduction
he Soil Moisture Active Passive (SMAP) spacecraft studies the Earth soil moisture and freeze / thaw state via an active L-band 1.26 Ghz Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and a passive L-band 1.4 GHz Radiometer (RAD) instrument. Over its three year mission, the SMAP mission completes a global map of the Earth surface every two to three days with an eight day repeat ground track. In order to achieve full land coverage with the SAR and RAD instruments, SMAP employs a rotating six-meter mesh reflector with a rotation rate of approximately 14.6 RPM creating wide swaths of coverage 1 . SMAP is a three-axis stabilized spacecraft in a sunsynchronous low earth orbit (LEO) at 685 km altitude. The orbit is a 6am 6pm ascending-descending node that experiences seasonal eclipses on the order of 20 minutes. The significant amount of stored momentum in the spinning reflector is balanced by four reaction wheel assemblies (RWAs) which are used for both momentum compensation as well as fine attitude control of the near zero momentum spacecraft. A reaction control system (RCS) of eight hydrazine thrusters is used to perform delta-V maneuvers for orbit maintenance and can be used to provide three-axis attitude control. Spacecraft power generation is provided via body fixed solar arrays and a secondary battery provides energy storage during periods of eclipse.
SMAP is a class C mission with largely single string hardware and some limited hardware redundancy. The fault management (FM) strategy is to employ a limited on-board fault protection (FP) system which is required to tolerate a protected fault set. The flight software (FSW) based FP design detects errors and takes corrective actions that recover enough functionality to place the observatory into a safe state and await ground instructions. Although the SMAP orbit provides frequent ground contact opportunities with the near earth network (NEN), attitude control is required to point the spacecraft into an orientation which supports a predictable RF communication link and simultaneously provides a power positive attitude with the solar arrays pointed toward the sun. Of particular significance to the on-board FP design is the large momentum stored in the spinning antenna and RWAs and the tolerance to failure scenarios that result in the spin-down of the antenna. Given the relative complexity required to recover active attitude control, and the limited staffing available on a class C mission, the FP team endeavored to perform as much early design analysis and validation as possible in an attempt to streamline the implementation and verification phases of the mission.
II. Fault Management Design Challenges
Fault Management, as a discipline, encounters several classical design challenges that are often not addressed until the formal V&V campaign. The first observed deficiency is that although system-level fault analyses such as Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and Fault Tree Analyses (FTA) are performed, there are rarely explicit, verifiable connections between the fault analyses and design requirements on the flight and ground fault management design. Of particular weakness is the connection and flow-down of fault management centric requirements on the mission system requirements on the ground operators. Secondly, after a "protected fault set" has been generated, it is rare that a rigorous analysis is performed to ensure that the flight (and ground) fault management design detects the resulting errors and responds with the appropriate mitigation before the effects of the fault result in a critical failure effect (such as unacceptably low battery state of charge). Engineering judgment is often applied during design specification to identify timing scenarios, which are deemed "stressful", but rarely is a systematic approach applied for the entire protected fault set. Lastly, the interaction between autonomous FP responses, ground interactions, and other software behaviors is rarely evaluated explicitly. Typical practice has been to find these "idiosyncrasies" during the test campaign rather than model and evaluate them at design time.
III. SMAP Fault Management Design Approach
In order to understand the failure modes and the effects on the system, SMAP performed a Functional Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and a Mission level Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). These analyses are typical reliability products developed during early mission phases for JPL missions. The FTA is a "top down" analysis, which focuses on the failure modes of the high-level mission phases and subsystem behaviors. The FMECA analysis is a "bottom up" analysis spanning the function failure modes of each subsystem. Some classical propulsion subsystem SPFs are shown in the FMECA snapshot in figure 2, these are common to N2H4 blow-down propulsion systems and are not unique to the SMAP mission.
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Follwing the generation of the FMECA and FTA, the leaves and branches of the FTA were combined with the failure modes in the system FMECA to comprise a comprehensive failure space. The failure space represents the collection of ways the SMAP hardware, functional behaviors and mission phases can fail. Note that the failure space is not a protected fault set, some of these failures modes are not mitigated and represent single point failures (SPF) of the SMAP mission. The failure space follows the same template as the Functional FMECA and is imported into a database program called FileMaker Pro. Duplicate failure modes (failures which are common to both the FMECA and FTA) are removed manually by fault protection engineers. Using this database, the fault protection team is then able to create relationships between the failure modes that have been identified and on-board compensating provisions such as FSW-based error monitors / responses or preventative measures such as a groundbased phasing test, and even specific verification and validation activities. The database can, and has, been used to inform risk trades given design changes.
III.A SMAP Risk Mitigation Matrix
The core of the SMAP fault management design is performed using a FileMaker Pro database in what we have called the SMAP Risk Mitigation Matrix. The mitigation matrix is an always-accessible online database that engineers can access and evaluate the current fault management design (as opposed to instanced documents or spreadsheets). The mitigation matrix refines upon the failure space to include preventative measures (tests, design features, analyses executed proactively during design do to reduce the likelihood of a particular failure mode occurring in flight) and mitigations (things which can be done reactively to reduce the consequence given a failure has occurred). Figure 3 provides a snapshot of the mitigation matrix; this particular failure mode is an inability to properly control the RWA speed due to a phasing error. The SMAP fault management design has both compensating provisions and preventative measures in place, which make this particular failure mode an acceptable risk. Ground based phasing tests performed on the flight vehicle reduce the likelihood of an RWA phasing failure (but not eliminate the possibility altogether), and on-board error monitors and responses detect the symptoms that result from such a failure (E.g. wheel speed control errors, spacecraft attitude and rate control errors, etc.) and place the observatory into a thruster based control mode which does not use the RWAs. Ground based recovery is required for resumption of science activities, which likely involves an update to the wheel transformation matrix.
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Figure 3: Snapshot of SMAP Risk Mitigation Matrix
The mitigation matrix contains a record for each failure mode in the failure space; only one record (out of thousands) is displayed in figure 3 . Somewhat unique to the SMAP fault management process is that engineers evaluated for each failure mode the time to criticality (TTC) of response. This represents the time it takes for a failure effect (e.g. loss of attitude control due to a wheel phasing error) to take a mission critical effect (such as loss of vehicle due to battery depletion). The monitor ID field creates a relationship between the analysis and the existing error monitors (also contained in a database). Figure 4 shows the MM with portals to the monitor and response database based on the monitors listed. A portal is just a small view into another database, in this case the monitor and response database which shares linkages with the MM database based on the monitor ID field. The monitor and response database has a detailed layout providing much more information than is shown in Figure 4 .
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The interference analysis was performed in two passes: Local Monitor/Response interaction and System Monitor/Response interaction (all tiers of every Response are evaluated). Some interference is precluded by functional characteristics of the Fault Protection design such as serial response execution, re-detection of errors following response completion or mode-dependent mapping of responses to declared errors. All system monitors and responses are placed into a large spreadsheet and an "N by N" interference analysis matrix is generated. Analysis is then performed on each of 36,864 combinations of system monitors and responses. There are three classification of interference between elements of FP:
Response to response interference Although responses are executed in series, there is still a potential for interference between responses. In response-to-response interference, the three key interference concerns are: one response "undo-ing" the actions of another response (e.g. over-temperature condition powers off SRU, can another response turn on that SRU and potentially cause a subsequent thermal failure), a response forces a transition which requires "higher" functionality (e.g. a scenario in which the FP design enters Safing and then later another response tries to place us back into Science), or after a combination of responses the system is left in an unsafe state (e.g. critical device is left unpowered -such as no powered IRU).
Monitor to response interference
In response-to-monitor interference, the interference being evaluated is if a monitor can/will be tripped due to a system response running. Several design changes were made to either the FP design or the low level FSW drivers to ensure monitors would not trip while devices were being reset. E.g. it is unacceptable if a GNC device reply timeout monitor trips every time the device is reset.
Monitor to monitor interference
In monitor-to-monitor interference, the interference being evaluated is if the local response of a monitor can trip another monitor, and also to ensure that if multiple monitors can be tripped as a result of a single fault that the end state is safe. When multiple monitors are tripped the possibility of multiple different responses being called is a concern which needs to be evaluated and is tested in the FP V&V campaign.
Systematically each pair is evaluated and dispositioned with one of following classifications. There were many instances of unacceptable interference were identified by the analysis and subsequently corrected via modifications to the FSW architecture or FP design. Types of modifications include: provisions within monitors and FSW to tolerate conditions resulting in transient loss of data, usage of response timeouts, tuning of thresholds and persistence limits, and new monitors and responses. One interesting finding discovered that it is unsafe to execute some corrective actions repeatedly. For example rapid repeated reassertion of some pulsed power switches can result in an unsafe thermal condition. It was discovered that the state assertion could be done by multiple un-correlated responses without knowledge of previous corrective actions taken by other responses and an
Figure 6 -Interference Matrix Layout
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Overall the design analyses performed by the SMAP FP team have improved the FM design process. It is possible to make more informed trades regarding the fault tolerance of the observatory and rigorously check that the design assumptions which engineers make during early FMECA/FTA activities are implemented per their expectations. While much work can be done to improve these analyses for future missions, they represent a step in the right direction toward an analytical assessment of the FM deisgn.
